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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ANITA J. ROBINSON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. 15331 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The relief already sought on appeal, as requested 
originally in Plaintiff's Brief, is reversal of Defendant's 
decision denying Plaintiff Unemployment Compensation from 
February 20, 1977, to April 2, 1977, and a declaration that 
U.C.A. §35-4-5(a) is invalid insofar as it chills the exer-
cise of religious and other freedoms guaranteed by the United 
States and Utah constitutions. 
Based upon the cases Plaintiff has examined in 
replying to Defendant's Brief, Plaintiff now seeks, in the 
alternative to Plaintiff's original request for relief, a 
remand to the Industrial commission of Utah for a new hearing 
so that the Industrial Commission may receive sufficient corn-
petent evldLnce upon which to decide the entire case. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts in this case are stated in Plaintiff's 
Brief as originally filed with the Court. For purposes of 
this Reply Brief, Plaintiff will re-emphasize two sets of 
facts. First, Plaintiff was employed as Secretary/Stenogra-
pher by the University of Utah with the understanding that 
she would not be required to work on Sundays. Plaintiff made 
this a requirement of accepting employment because her re-
1 igious belief is that Sundays are a day of rest to be employed 
in worship of the Lord. Notwithstanding this provision of 
Plaintiff's contract, the employer made numerous requests 
that Plaintiff work on Sundays, and Plaintiff was, in fact, 
forced to work on three Sundays. It was a demand by the 
employer that Plaintiff work on Sunday, January 30, 1977, 
which precipitated Plaintiff's decision not to report to 
work and ultimately caused Plaintiff's termination of employmen1 
Second, Plaintiff frequently was subjected, in the 
presence of other employees, to false charges of improper 
performance. The employer wrote numerous memos charging 
Plaintiff with faulty work and subjected Plaintiff to verbal 
criticisms on numerous other occasions. There was no factual 
justification for these criticisms, Plaintiff's work being 
competent and of good quality. The only apparent reason 
for the criticisms was the employer's dissatisfaction with 
Plaintiff's refusals to work on Sundays and at other unreason-
able hours. When the employer realized that Plaintiff would 
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not accede to such demands, the employer responded by criti-
cizing Plaintiff's work. 
These and other reasons made work intolerable for 
Plaintiff and forced her to terminate her employment on 
February 3, 1977. She was informed she would be fired, in 
any case, on February 4, 1977. 
ARGUMENT 
I PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO REVERSAL OF 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DECISION 
OR TO A REMAND TO THE INDUSTRIAL COM-
MISSION FOR REHEARING IF THE COMMISSION'S 
FINDINGS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE. 
As this Court stated in Martinez v. Board of Review, 
25 U.2d 131, 477 P.2d 587, 588 (1970), the Court's review 
in Unemployment Compensation cases is limited to deciding 
whether there is "substantial competent evidence to sustain 
the findings of the Appeals Referee and the Board of Review." 
Where the decision of the Board of Review is supported by 
substantial, competent evidence, the Court will affirm the 
Industrial commission. Martinez, supra. However, the Court 
has always recognized its duty to determine whether evidence 
does support the Board of Review's decision. As stated in 
Roberts v. Industrial commission, 97 Utah 434, 93 P.2d 494, 
495 (1939): 
Each record of trial under this law should 
be complete in and of itself. Each element 
necessary to sustain an order by the trib-
unal or commission, under this law, should 
-3-
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be supported by testimony, exhibits, or 
stipulation, introduced at the hearing. 
Where the record does not support the Industrial 
Commission, this Court may elect either of two alternatives. 
It may reverse the decision of the Industrial Commission. 
See Roberts, supra; Gocke v. Wiesley, 18 Utah 2d 245, 420 
P.2d 44 (1966). Or it may remand the case to the Industrial 
Commission to take additional evidence on issues about which 
the record is unclear. This latter course was elected in 
Johnson v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission, 7 
Utah 2d 113, 320 P.2d 315 (1958), a case involving determina-
tion of the plaintiff's income while unemployed. In remanding 
to the Industrial Commission this Court stated: 
There is another particular about which 
the record is so uncertain that no satisfactory 
finding can be made. Mr. Johnson did not operate 
the farm by himself. Rather, it was a 
family project. His 15 year-old son and 
his wife did much of the farm work, even 
to the extent of running the tractor. The 
entire farm income should therefore not be 
attributed to him personally, but there 
ought to be some fair and reasonable allo-
cation of the income produced by his efforts 
and that produced by his wife and son. 
In view of the uncertainty which exists 
as to Mr. Johnson's income from self-employment, 
this cause is remanded for the purpose of 
making a more definite determination of the 
income properly assignable to him, and upon 
the basis thereof to make such order consist-
ent with the views herein expressed, as may 
seem appropriate. 320 P.2d at 319. 
The practice of remand is followed by courts in numerous 
other jurisdictions in umemployment compensation cases. 
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See, ~· Ambridge Savings & Loan Association v. Unemployment 
Compensation Board of Review, 124 A.2d 513 (Pa. Super. 
1956), and Lee v. Brown, 148 So.2d 321 (La. App. 1963), which 
are both discussed below. The practice also is in keeping 
with general principles of administrative law. As stated in 
2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, §764: 
[T]he general rule is that even in the absence 
of statute, a court which sets aside an adminis-
trative determination has the power to remand 
the case to the administrative agency where such 
power is necessary to effectuate the demands of 
justice, and statutes frequently grant such 
authority to the courts. The court does not 
encroach upon the administrative function by 
such procedure, and there is nothing in the 
principles governing judicial review of adminis-
trative acts which precludes the courts from 
giving an administrative agency an opportunity 
to meet objections to its order by correcting 
irregularities in procedure, or supplying defi-
ciencies in its record, or making additional 
findings where these are necessary, or supplying 
findings validly made in the place of those 
attacked as invalid. 
This Court has the authority either to reverse the Industrial 
commission or to remand for additional hearing by the 
commission. In view of the Board of Review's failure to 
take evidence and make findings on essential factual issues, 
remand is the minimum relief that this Court should grant 
Plaintiff. 
assertion: 
II THE ONLY COMPETENT EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT 
PLAINTIFF'S CONTRACT ALLOWED HER NOT 
TO WORK ON SUNDAYS. 
In its Brief, Defendant makes a flat but erroneous 
"There is direct testimonial evidence that at 
-5-
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her initial employment interview Plaintiff agreed to work on 
Sundays. (R.0019)" Defendant's Brief at 6. In fact, there 
is no competent evidence, testimonial or otherwise, that 
Plaintiff agreed to work on Sundays. The evidence to which 
Defendant refers is hearsay. It comes from a document that 
was neither a sworn affidavit nor attested to under oath at 
the hearing. The only direct testimonial evidence, both 
from Plaintiff and from the employer, shows that Plaintiff 
did not agree to work on Sundays. 
The record is replete with evidence that Plaintiff 
told the employer that Plaintiff would not work on Sundays. 
Plaintiff clearly stated that this was one condition she in-
sisted on before accepting work with the employer. (R.0010, 
0036) Her other testimony shows the reason for this 
demand, a strong religious conviction against work on Sundays. 
(R.0010, 0035, 0036) In fact, being forced to work on Sundays 
upset Plaintiff so much that ultimately she contacted Thomas 
Hubbard, the employer's Employee Relations Representative, 
to inquire whether she should file a grievance report. 
(R.0032} Thus the record contains testimony both proving 
that Plaintiff requested and was granted the right not to 
work on Sunday and demonstrating the importance of the 
reasons which motivated Plaintiff's request. 
Defendant contends that there is t8stimonial evi-
dence to rebut this strong showing in the record that Plain-
tiff was given the contractual right not to work on Sundays. 
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But there is nothing in the record to support Defendant's 
assertion. The employ0r's testimony specifically shows that 
the employer also was aware of and even claimed to have 
"respected" Plaintiff's contractual right to refuse Sunday 
work. There are two places in the record where the employer 
specifically discusses this question. In both instances, the 
testimony supports Plaintiff. 
The first statement by the employer is in reponse 
to a question about the amount of overtime Plaintiff was 
forced to work, at R.0029: 
Q. So this would be over the regular number of 
hours, say 40 hours a week? 
Ms. Leininger. Uh, seldom ever. Seldom ever did 
it go over 40 hours, See, for instance, if 
she helped on Saturday afternoon and that, on 
her total time there were only two Saturdays and 
one Sunday that she worked, I'd have to check 
back for sure on that, I'm sorry I didn't docu-
ment that part, I have it on my calendar, uh, 
and then there was another Sunday that she wanted 
to work and requested to work and said there 
was no problem, church or otherwise. And 
I said well now and I'd respected all the 
way through and anytime she didn't want to 
and she said no this was the time because 
she had been gone and she wanted to take a 
weekend and she'd be back and she'd like to 
work when it was quiet. 
Q. So this then, this work on Sunday was 
at her option? 
Ms. Leininger. This was an agreement {Emphasis 
added.] 
Plaintiff does not concede that she ever "wanted" to work on 
Sundays. In fact, the supervisor blackmailed Plaintiff into 
accepting this work by making clear that Plaintiff otherwise 
could not have that Saturday off wh~n Plaintiff absolutely 
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had to have that Saturday off to move between apartments. 
(R.0035) Even so, the supervisor admitted in the above state-
ment that she was aware Plaintiff did not work on Sundays and 
had "respected" Plaintiff's right not to do so. 
The only other testimony by the supervisor discuss-
ing work on Sunday is equally favorable to Plaintiff. It 
shows that Plaintiff told the supervisor that Plaintiff would 
not work on Sundays and that the supervisor told Plaintiff 
that she would only have to work one or two Saturdays a month. 
The supervisor addressed the Referee's question about Sunday 
work in the following manner, at R.0031: 
Q. Did she discuss, ever discuss this matter 
of Sunday working with you, to the end that 
it be discontinued? 
Ms. Leininger. Never. She never. The first, 
uh, and really on the first time she said she 
would be prefer it's true she preferred to 
work Saturday afternoon and I said that 
would be fine. I said it would never be 
any more than one or two Saturdays a month. 
[Emphasis added.] 
This testimony by the supervisor also supports Plainitff's 
position that she was entitled not to work on Sundays. 
Against this sworn testimony, Defendant has found 
only a statement written on an unsigned document entitled 
"Anita Robinson - Employment Record." (R.0019) The only 
purpose for which the document was submitted in evidence was 
to provide a sequence of dates. (R.0028) Its authenticity 
was never attested to. The Appeals Referee did not even ask 
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who prepared the document or whether its preparer had personal 
knowledge of its statements. The statement on which Defendant 
relies was not even part of the original document, but 
was added by unknown persons later on. 
This is not the "substantial competent evidence" 
required by Martinez v. Board of Review, supra. A similar 
situation was presented in Lee v. Brown, supra, an unemploy-
ment compensation case from Louisiana. A finding that the 
plaintiff had been fired for cause was based on an unauthenti-
cated hearsay letter from another employee to an officer of 
the plaintiff's employer. The letter there, like the "Employ-
ment Record" here, was self-serving. And the Court held the 
letter insufficient to sustain the decision: 
This hearsay evidence and this ex parte 
document did not, of course, constitute 
evidence competent to prove the charged 
disqualification. 
It is true that the statute provides 
that the "usual rules of evidence" do not 
govern the admissibility of evidence at the 
administrative hearing. LSA-R.S. 23:1631. 
Nevertheless, although normally inadmissible 
evidence may be received at the hearing, the 
actual findings of the administrative agency 
that a claimant is disqualified from benefits 
must be supported by competent evidence. As 
stated at 81 c.J.S. Social Security and Public 
Welfare §221, p. 318: "It is generally held 
that the decisions and findings of an adminis-
trative tribunal in unemployment compensation 
cases must be supported by competent evidence. 
The relaxation of the general rules of evi-
dence does not mean that the administrative 
tribunal can treat as evidence matter which is 
not evidence and has no probative force, and 
-9-
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it does not justify orders without a basis 
in evidence having rational probative force. 
Findings of fact supported only by incompetent 
or hearsay evidence are improper, and hearsay 
evidence will not be considered in determining 
whether the findings are supported by the 
evidence,**." 
Thus, administrative findings will be set 
aside on judicial review, if supported only 
by hearsay or other normally inadmissible 
evidence of a nature that does not afford the 
claimant a fair opportunity of rebuttal or 
cross-examination. Miller v. F.W. Woolworth 
Co., 359 Mich. 342, 102 N. W. 2d 728 (1960); 
Ault v. Unemployment Compensation Board, 398 
Pa.250, 157 A.2d 375; Phillips v. Unemployment 
Compensation Board, 152 Pa.Super. 75, 30 A.2d 
718 (1943).... 148 So. 2d at 324-25. 
The evidence supporting the Board of Review in this case is 
identical to the evidence in Lee v. Brown. The disposition 
of this case also should be the same. The decision of the 
Board of Review should be reversed for lack of substantial 
competent evidence. 
Indeed, this Court has adhered to the rule that 
findings cannot be supported wholly by hearsay or other evi-
dence incompetent in a court of law even when the evidence 
was far more reliable than the unauthenticated letter in Lee 
or the unsigned record Defendant relies on in this case. L1 
Hackford v. Industrial Commission, 358 P.2d 899 (Utah 1961), 
the Industrial Commission's findings as to the plaintiff's 
lumbosacral injuries were based upon the two reports of the 
plaintiff's treating physician, accompanied by X-rays, and 
corroborated by the report of a panel of three orthopedic 
surgeons. Moreover, the panel members were present at the 
-10-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
administrative hearing to testify as to their report, but the 
plaintiff's attorney expressly rejected an offer to cross-
examine them. And against these reports, even the medical 
witnesses whom the plaintiff produced were equivocal as to 
the plaintiff's disability. Id. at 900. 
The medical assessment of a worker's condition 
implicates a more sharply focused and easily documented 
decision than the questions concerning the terms of an agree-
ment or the cause for termination of employment in Plaintiff's 
case. In Hackford, the decision whether to award disability 
benefits turned upon routine, standard, unbiased medical 
reports by physician specialists concerning a subject they 
had personally examined. In Plaintiff's case, credibility 
and veracity played a significant role in the Commission's 
decision, but even when such problems were not a factor, this 
Court reversed the Commission's decision, stating: 
[T]here must be a residuum of evidence, 
legal and competent in a court of law, 
to support an award, and a finding cannot 
be based wholly upon hearsay evidence. 
Id. at 901. 
III PLAINTIFF'S RIC!IT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION 
ALLOWED HER NOT TO WORK ON SUNDAYS. 
Defendant admits that if Plaintiff's religious 
belief was sincere, her right to free exercise of her religion 
was violated by denying her Unemployment Compensation due to 
her refusal to work on Sunday. Defendant's Brief at 12. Yet 
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the Appeals Referee disregarded all indications of the sin-
cerity of Plaintiff's belief. Her sincerity was first shown 
by her statement that she would not work Sunday which she made 
at her initial interview for the job, before she knew that the 
job conditions might be undesirable, and at the risk of not 
being hired. (R.0036) From the outset she stated to the 
Department of Employment Security that her reason for quitting 
was the requirement to work on Sunday - long before she knew 
that her claim would be dependent on the sincerity of her 
belief. (R.0047) 
The Referee questioned whether Plaintiff's refusal 
to work Sundays was the tenet of a specific church, and in 
response to her statement that she attended various churches, 
he considered her not wanting to work Sundays a desire rather 
than a belief. This questioning was irrelevant and had 
prejudicial effect, whereas the resultant conclusion is con-
trary to the rest of the evidence. Plaintiff stated her 
objection to Sunday work as follows: 
It's for religious purposes. I think that 
if the Lord has said has said it is a day of rest 
and I personally believe that no matter what 
religion we are, whether its, uh, a require-
ment of the church we go to, whether our church 
tells us to, I believe personally that it is 
a day of rest and shouldn't be used for work 
purposes. R.0035 
It is not a desire, it's a belief and a very, 
uh, it's a very strong belief with me. I think 
that the Lord said that he made that decree 
whether it with one church or not. R.0036 
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The U11ited States Supreme Court has made it clear 
that the right to free exercise of religion is not confined 
to traditional or parochial concepts of religion; it is not 
conditioned upon membership in or adherence to the teachings 
of any organized religion. As set forth in Davis v. Beason, 
133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890}: 
With man's relations to his Maker and the 
obligations he may think they impose, and 
the manner in which an expression shall be 
made by him of his belief on those subjects, 
no interference can be permitted •••• 
The United States and Utah Constitutions do not select any 
one group or any one type of religion for preferred treatment. 
See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 76, 87 (1944). Other-
wise, if only particular beliefs or membership in churches 
are recognized as those allowed free exercise, the Establish-
ment Clause is violated. In Plaintiff's case, it is apparent 
that she is a strict fundamentalist whose beliefs derive 
directly from the Bible, and the best characterization of 
those beliefs might be that for her churches are only too 
liberal with ther interpretations of the Scriptures. 
The Appeals Referee found that Plaintiff's religious 
beliefs were not sincere because she worked on two Sundays. 
Yet the Referee made no finding as to Plaintiff's economic 
needs at that time which may have compelled her to work so 
as to gain her employer's favor. In this instance, Plaintiff 
was forced to choose between following her religious precepts 
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and risking her employment or abandoning her religious pre-
cepts and working on Sunday. A condition of employment where 
an employee must choose between her job and her religious 
beliefs cannot be countenanced in keeping with the guiding 
principle of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 ll963), under 
which unemployment benefits may not be denied where employ-
ment conditions have imposed a burden on the free exercise 
of religion. 
In applying the eligibility provisions of the Utah 
Unemployment Compensation law, Defendant concedes that the 
Utah Industrial Commission is bound by the demands of the 
Free Exercise Clause as authoritatively conceived by the 
majority opinion in Sherbert. Defendant's Brief at 12. From 
the outset of her employment relationship, Plaintiff insisted 
upon observing her day of rest. After discussing her reli-
gious needs with her employer and still being accepted for 
employment, Plaintiff later acceded to her employer's demand 
that she work on Sunday. There is no telling under what 
economic pressure she performed that Sunday work, until 
eventually her conscience impelled her to assert a positive 
refusal. Defendant contends that having once strayed from 
the precepts of her religion by working on Sunday, Plaintiff 
somehow forfeited her right to freely exercise her religion. 
Defendant did not even consider the fact that Plaintiff, 
due to economic necessity, may have had no real choice between 
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workir1g Sunday and abiding by the precepts of her religion. 
There can be no waiver when the element of choice is in 
reality one ''between the rock and the whirlpool." Garrity 
v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 493, 498 (1967). Nor can important 
constitutional rights be waived except in a knowing and in-
telligent manner. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 
673 (1974); D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick co., 405 U.S. 174 
(1972); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 ll972). Moreover, 
the very notion of waiver is novel to considerations of the 
free exercise of religion and must not be allowed to creep 
into free exercise doctrine. The preferred freedoms of the 
United States and Utah Constitutions cannot be so easily 
curtailed by the cursory application of a waiver theory. 
No case dealing with infringement upon the free 
exercise of religion has found any waiver, actual or implied, 
of the protections afforded by the Free Exercise Clause. See 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Spence v. Bailey, 
465 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1972); Lincoln v. True, 408 F. Supp. 
22 (W.D. Ky. 1975). In each of these cases, the court rec-
ognized that although one may submit to infringements upon 
religious freedom to a certain point, at some point further 
submission is intolerable. At no point may the exercise of 
religious freedom be "deter{red] or discouragefdJ" by denying 
government benefits due to the assertion of that right. 
Sherbert, supra, 405; Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 
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(1958) . Even when the pressure to forfeit the right is not 
overwhelming, the United States Supreme Court itself has 
specifically interpreted the Sherbert principle to encompass 
such infringements: 
This Court's decisions have prohibited 
conditions on •.. jobs or otherwise, which 
dampen the exercise generally of First 
Amendment rights, however slight the 
inducement to the individual to forsake 
those rights. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 
347, 348 n.11 (1976). (Emphasis added.) 
Indeed, that Plaintiff may have permitted economic 
necessity to conquer her conscience on a previous occasion 
is a slender reed upon which to justify the denial of a 
government benefit due to the assertion of a fundamental 
right. As set forth under ARGUMENT II, supra, Plaintiff did 
not agree to work on Sunday, and the pressure upon her to 
forego the practice of her religion, as in Sherbert, is un-
mistakable. Even when Plaintiff inquired whether she could 
obtain relief from having to work Sunday, the Employee Relations 
Representative provided no resolution - he needed to "research 
to find out." (R.0032) From the Representative's testimony, 
it is hardly clear that Plaintiff could not have been led to 
believe that further pursuit of a grievance was futile. Nor 
is it clear that she could not have been led to believe that 
she had sufficiently presented her grievance. The Represen-
tative admitted that an oral presentation was normal procedure. 
(R.0032) Yet even if Plaintiff felt pressured to forego her 
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principles without her representative's wholehearted support, 
Defendant's resurrection of this aberrant interruption of 
religious principles, to negate Plaintiff's right to ever 
again adhere to them without denial of government benefits, 
institutes a novel justification - for which no authority 
exists - for governmental intrusion into religious liberty. 
Unless reversed by this Court, Defendant's decision 
will result in a serious and detrimental "chilling effect" on 
the exercise of religious beliefs by both Plaintiff and other 
workers. See Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 115 (1974). Under 
Defendant's decision, if employees accede to an employer's 
demand to violate their religious precepts even once, they 
may never again be able to abide by them without fear of 
denial of Unemployment Compensation. Employers on the other 
hand, will be discoura9ed from any "reasonable accomodation" 
of religious beliefs. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. 
Hardison, U.S. , 97 s.ct. 2264 (1977). 
IV DEFENDANT VIOLATED FURTHER CONTRACT 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
Def~ndant attempts to justify other unreasonable 
working conditions upon the assertion that Plaintiff consented 
to them. Defendant admits both that Plaintiff was required 
to work odd hours and that her initial agreement only required 
her to work from 11:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m., Defendant's Brief, 
at 8, but then argues that because she fulfilled the extra 
work requirements, they were not out of compliance. Again, 
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there is neither evidence that Plaintiff agreed to new terms 
nor any finding as to the compelling nature of the employer's 
demands and Plaintiff's economic needs. Although as Defendant 
states, Plaintiff was subsequently given overtime pay or 
compensatory time off, Defendant's Brief at 2, the fact that 
Plaintiff was only belatedly given her pay and the employer's 
lack of cooperation in scheduling time off were just further 
conditions about which Plaintiff might complain, as shown 
at Defendant's citation to the record and following. (R. 0037-33; 
Defendant cites R.0034 as support for finding that 
Plaintiff's constitutional right to vote was not infringed. 
However, R.0034 reveals the glaring fact that the employer 
required Plaintiff to work 50 minutes overtime. Relying on 
the terms of her employment contract that her work day ended 
at 7:00 p.m., which would have allowed ample time to travel 
to her polling place, Plaintiff had no reason to have tried 
to obtain time off from her morning job. Furthermore, after 
Plaintiff expressed her desire to vote, the overtime require-
ment constituted an intentionl infringement of her right. 
Neither can Defendant fall back on the 10-minute trip between 
the University and the polls as support for finding it would 
not have taken too long to travel there after the morning 
job, when such a trip would have involved not only a trip 
between the polls and the University at breakneck speed, but 
the added distance between the morning job and the polls -
when Plaintiff was required to be at the second job immediatel; 
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after the prior job. Even accepting the employer's testimony 
that Plaintiff did not always arrive immediately after the 
prior job on other occasions, this only raises an issue of 
misconduct, which constitutes an entirely separate ground for 
disqualification from benefits under U.C.A. §35-4-5(b) (1), 
which only pertains if an employee is discharged, and which 
was not properly raised as an issue herein, although Plain-
tiff did proffer evidence of her satisfactory performance, 
as discussed infra. 
To summarize the issue of infringement upon Plain-
tiff's right to vote, however, the fact that Plaintiff 
exercised that right by violating traffic laws and risking 
life and limb, rather than being prevented under any circum-
stances, hardly resolves the problem of infringement. 
V THE APPEALS REFEREE AND BOARD OF REVIEW 
FAILED TO TAKE EVIDENCE OR MAKE FINDINGS 
ON THE ISSUE OF HARASSMENT BY PLAINTIFF'S 
SUPERVISOR. 
In her initial Brief, Plaintiff emphasized that 
she was harassed by unwarranted criticism of her work. Plain-
tiff's Brief at 12-15. Defendant does not question the auth-
ority cited by Plaintiff to the effect that such harassment 
constitutes good cause for Plaintiff's voluntary quitting 
of employment. Instead, Defendant contends that the evidence 
supports the Board's finding that Plaintiff was not harassed. 
Defendant's Brief at 8-9. The problem with this contention 
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is that the Appeals Referee not only refused to listen to 
Plaintiff, but ultimately neglected to make any findings at 
all on the issue of her harassment. Despite Defendant's 
attempt to gloss over these problems, there are no findings 
on harassment which this Court can uphold. 
Now Plaintiff can only ask this court to review the 
record for itself. The Board of Review merely affirmed the 
Appeals Referee's decision. (R.0007) The Appeals Referee 
made no findings on the quality of Plaintiff's work or the 
validity of the supervisor's criticism of the work. (R.0010-
0018) There is no discussion of harassment in either opinion. 
However, the record is clear that Plaintiff pro-
ferred evidence to the Appeals Referee to show that her work 
was satisfactory, and this evidence was refused: 
Q. All right, fine. Please continue. 
As far as my job performance, I have, uh, 
we kept copies of all of the work that we 
did, original work, and I had a book of at 
least I would say, three or four inch, as 
large as those books that you have on your 
desk there, book and had started on another 
one. As far as production, my shorthand was 
coming along very well, in fact, on one day 
I took, uh, 28 or 30 pages of legal a type-
writer pad, this full, over the telephone, in 
notes from her and typed, uh subsequently the 
notes and I have a copy of that draft of 
not~s showing that the steno and typing was 
satisfactory. 
Q. Well, the question, question here is 
not regarding the quality and adequacy of 
your work, its you voluntarily terminated 
your employment and we're trying to deter-
mine why you terminated that employment. 
R.0039. [Emphasis added.] 
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Yet the record contains ample evidence that the supervisor 
was criticizing Plaintiff's work throughout her employment 
(R.0022, 0023, 0025), and the fact that the criticism was 
unwarranted was why she terminated her employment. The 
Appeals Referee even allowed the supervisor to repeat this 
criticism at the hearing. (R.0032, 0033) But he did not 
give Plaintiff a chance to prove that this criticism was 
unjustified. 
Defendant's approach to the continual criticism of 
Plaintiff's work is to take for granted that the work was 
"inadequate" and to congratulate the supervisor for not 
terminating Plaintiff earlier. Defendant's Brief at 9. This 
argument misses the real issue. If Plaintiff's work was, in 
fact, adequate, then the numerous derogatory memos and verbal 
criticisms to which Plaintiff was subjected were grounds for 
Plaintiff's leaving work. The memos would be unreasonable, 
no matter how worded, if they falsely accused Plaintiff of 
poor performance. But the Appeals Referee did not care to 
examine the evidence offered by Plaintiff at the hearing to 
disprove the supervisor's criticisms. Defendant continues, 
before this Court, to overlook the possibility that Plaintiff 
was doing good work. 
The Appeals Referee fell short of his duty to Plain-
tiff. That duty was expressed in Hicks v. Mathews, 424 F. 
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Supp. 8, 10 (D. Md. 1976), with respect to Social Security 
Insurance claims: 
Harp v. Richardson, CCH UIR para. 17,324, 
p.2413 (D. Md. 1973) (Murray, J.) does impose 
a duty on the administrative law judge "in 
appropriate instances affirmatively to probe, 
inquire and explore the relevant facts", not 
to "turn every stone or act as an advocate for 
every unrepresented claimant", but "to attempt 
to draw out ***ItheJ potential" strength of a 
plaintiff's contentions when "the particular 
circumstances of a case clearly suggest that a 
claimant's proof of his claim is stronger than 
what he, on his own, has produced***" (at p.2415). 
Judge Murray, in remanding, held that those 
obligations were not sufficiently performed 
in Harp by the Administrative Law Judge. Nor 
have they been sufficiently performed herein. 
The duty of any administrative hearing officer to an unrepre-
sented claimant certainly does not allow an Appeals Referee 
to reject evidence that would support a plaintiff's claim 
for unemployment insurance. Plaintiff was unrepresented at 
her hearing, so that the Appeals Referee should have met his 
own obligation to bring to light evidence favorable to Plain-
tiff. He did not come close to fulfilling this duty. On 
the contrary, he refused relevant information offered by 
Plaintiff. He may well have committed this error by acci-
dent. Nonetheless it was error. As shown below, it at least 
requires that the case be remanded to the Industrial Commission 
to allow Plaintiff the opportunity to present the evidence she 
originally offered. 
-22-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
VI THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE AND REMAND THE 
DECISION OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW BECAUSE 
THE BOARD FAILED TO MAKE NECESSARY FIND-
INGS OF FACT. 
It is clear that the decision made by the Board of 
Review in this case contains reversible error. The only 
question is what remedy Plaintiff is entitled to. At a 
minimum, the case should be returned to the Industrial Corn-
mission for a rehearing. That course has been sanctioned by 
this Court in Johnson v. Board of Review, supra. It also is 
a practice followed by other state courts in unemployment 
compensation cases. For example, in Ambridge Savings & Loan 
Association v. Unemployment compensation Board of Review, supra, 
517, the court remanded an unemployment compensation case for 
rehearing, stating: 
Where factual questions are not resolved 
this court will remand the case to the Board 
for further proceedings. 
*** 
There is no finding as to whether or not 
the claimant took the precautions which a reasonably 
prudent person should take to preserve the 
employment relationship during her absence 
and whether or not her conduct was consist-
ent with a genuine desire to work. We can-
not assume from the award that the Board 
made the necessary findings, for to infer 
the facts from the conslusion would be "an 
inversion of logical reasoning". Myers 
Unemployment Compensation Case, 1949, 164 Pa. 
Super. 150, 63 A.2d 371, 373. 
Since it is not the duty of this Court 
to decide whose testimony is credible and 
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which facts are determinative we must refer 
the matter back to the Board to make findings 
and appropriate conclusions and to enter an 
order in conformity with such findings and 
conclusions. Lavely Unemployment Compensa-
tion Case, 1948, 163 Pa. Super. 66, 60 A.2d 
352. 
The record in Plaintiff's case clearly presents points on 
which the Board failed to make necessary findings. If this 
Court finds the record unclear as to the proper findings on 
those points, then Plaintiff's case should be remanded. 
CONCLUSION 
On any of the procedural, contractual, and consti-
tutional bases set out above and in Plaintiff's original 
Brief, Plaintiff should be granted relief from Defendant's 
decision. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Lucy Billings 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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